Fiona Bare

Abstract: Did firms shift resources to decarbonization in the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, especially in industries where technology permits relatively cheap low-carbon options? The Paris Agreement marked a key moment in climate cooperation, uniting countries towards a common goal of limiting global temperature increase to well below 2 degrees. However, achieving this target is largely dependent on the behavior of corporate actors given that companies have been responsible for the lion’s share of greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, we examine whether the Paris Agreement changed corporate behavior among “convertible” industries, focusing on automobile manufacturers. Political science literature points to two very different viewpoints on this question. Using five types of primary source materials such as earnings call transcripts and production reports, we find quite limited evidence that the Paris Agreement shifted business strategy in the car sector. Overall, the evidence should lead dispassionate analysts to revise downward their beliefs about Paris impact. Still, the Paris Agreement might have created an enabling environment for more ambitious domestic policy in the long run.

Abstract: Mobilizing capital is critical for addressing climate change, yet international climate finance is slow to reach recipients. Why does funding stall as the crisis accelerates? This paper develops a theory of strategic delay rooted in two challenges common to development finance but especially acute in climate aid: projects yield both public and private goods, and outcomes are highly uncertain. I formalize how these features complicate bargaining and impede disbursement in a game-theoretic model. To evaluate the model, I trace broader patterns in the negotiation-to-implementation process for twenty-seven major multilateral climate funds (2003 – 2024) and analyze novel data on project timelines at the Green Climate Fund. Financing patterns reflect observable implications of the theory: disbursement is slower under conditions of uncertainty, preference misalignment, and limited compromise in project design. Elite interviews further illuminate the institutional and political frictions involved. The findings contribute to debates on international cooperation and institutional design, while offering practical insights for improving the speed and equity of global development financing mechanisms.

Abstract: Sovereign green bonds, debt instruments tied to environmental goals, have emerged as an innovation to fill climate financing gaps. Yet countries vary widely in whether and how they adopt these instruments. This paper argues that sovereign green bond issuance reflects strategic calculations shaped by both material and symbolic factors. Governments’ market capacity and green ambition jointly determine the costs and benefits of issuing these instruments, producing four ideal types: leaders, exploiters, seekers, and outsiders. These types illuminate the main patterns of state engagement with green finance and clarify why issuance is common for some governments and absent for others. Drawing on in-depth interviews with debt managers and a cross-national dataset of sovereign issuances from 2016–2024, the paper shows that green bonds serve both sincere and strategic purposes, shaped by domestic political constraints and countries’ positions in global capital markets. These findings speak to broader debates in international relations and political economy about how states engage with global norms and financial instruments, highlighting the political agency governments exercise in navigating credibility, investment, and climate commitments.

Abstract: Europe’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to prevent carbon leakage and pave the way for the expansion of emissions trading to carbon-intensive industrial products. While the stakes for European decarbonization are clear, what will carbon border taxes mean for decarbonization efforts in foreign markets? We develop a model of policymaking in the presence of lobbying and international trade, and analyze the impacts of a carbon tariff on equilibrium levels of climate regulation in the home country. Tariffs undermine the efficiency of exporting firms, making them less able to absorb the costs of domestic regulation and more likely to oppose via lobbying. Where adjustment costs are high, equilibrium regulation is decreasing in the foreign tariff. Pegging tariffs to the level of domestic regulation leads to more stringent policy but undermines firm incentives to invest in green technology.

Abstract: Multilateral diplomacy is a deeply social activity, in which interpersonal interactions allow diplomats to negotiate compromises across heterogeneous preferences. Deeper social ties enable diplomats to develop trust, exchange information, and reduce miscommunication, which are instrumental in successful negotiations. Can physical proximity between diplomats facilitate social relationships, thus fostering increased multilateral cooperation? We leverage the randomized seating arrangement of the UN General Assembly to investigate this question, probing whether spatially proximate diplomats are more likely to collaborate and vote similarly compared to spatially disparate diplomats. We find support for our expectation that diplomats seated next to each other are more likely to vote similarly, even after controlling for measures of state influence and affinity, and that the mechanism behind this effect is individual-level social relations between diplomats. Our results speak to the importance of face-to-face diplomacy conducted through international organizations (IOs), as well as the role of individual bureaucrats in shaping international political outcomes.

Abstract: What happens when international organizations give equal voice to countries with unequal power? This paper investigates the distributive politics of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the world’s largest multilateral climate finance institution, which operates under a rare system of equal board representation between developed and developing countries. Leveraging a new dataset of transcribed and annotated GCF board meeting videos, the paper examines how this institutional design shapes negotiation dynamics and organizational conflict. Analysis reveals sharp divides over funding priorities—such as mitigation versus adaptation and the role of private sector finance—as well as recurring tensions between the Board and the Secretariat. These findings illuminate how formal institutional rules interact with informal power dynamics, complicating consensus and implementation. By bringing new empirical evidence to bear on multilateral deliberations, this study contributes to theories of international organization, global climate governance, and the political economy of development finance.

Abstract: Who supports energy transition in the Global South? Climate finance commitments have tripled in recent years, but we know little about how citizens in the Global South evaluate decarbonization policies. Combining media analysis with an original survey experiment in South Africa, we examine how political elites and the public respond to energy transition funding. First, we employ media analysis to document a counter-intuitive finding: transition policies receive greater support among right-leaning political elites and are generally opposed by left-leaning elites. Next, we field a survey experiment exploring drivers of this divide. We hypothesize that energy transition appeals to conservatives because it is perceived as pro-business, increasing privatization and opportunities for foreign direct investment. Yet it is opposed by those on the left due to concerns about its impacts on poverty alleviation: sovereign borrowing needed to fund the energy transition threatens to crowd out social services and provision of government jobs.

Abstract: Climatic changes increase weather variability, contributing to unpredictable cycles of resource abundance and scarcity. As these effects become more frequent, severe, and widely experienced, there is an open question as to whether cooperative solutions to common pool resource problems will endure. In this paper, I explore how climate variability impacts collective resource management using a game-theoretic model. In the face of exogenous climate fluctuations, cooperative land management is possible through repeated interactions. However, as the risk of climatic shocks increases and the impacts become more severe, cooperative strategies can no longer be maintained. Greater uncertainty about tomorrow increases individual profit-seeking behavior today, leading to resource overexploitation. The theory is motivated by findings from key informant interviews and focus group discussions conducted in pastoral regions of northern Kenya. This analysis indicates that climate change is likely to undermine the effectiveness of local institutions, raising questions about future governance of the commons.